IN THE following paper, I will be operating within the framework of moral concepts set out by R. M. Hare in his Language of Morals and Freedom and Reason. Using this framework, I shall attempt to show that (a) if we claim that certain attitudes we have toward animals are moral, then the application of the consequences of these principles leads us into a rather bizarre, if not outlandish, position, which few would accept as prima facie moral; and (b) if we adopt what can be accepted as a truly moral position with respect to animals, this will turn out to be indistinguishable in kind, if not in degree, from our morality with respect to humans.
I
In this section, I should like to depart somewhat from a strictly Harean approach and discuss the concept of a moral, or natural right. The argument in Hare most analogous to the recognition of an individual's moral rights is the argument of imagination. One is asked to conceive of oneself in the position of the individual towards whom a course of action is considered. One could not (logically) universalise over any actions that one would not wish upon oneself. Some might protest that it is impossible to imagine being an animal since there isn't enough left of the person doing the imagining after the 'transference' has been made. I think the confusion in this contention lies partly in overestimating the amount of oneself that needs to be taken along in the act of imagination and partly in an ignorance, or blindness, which most of us share, about animals. In any case, one of my reasons for discussing the strategy of recognising rights rather than applying one's imagination is that where some might object to Hare's tactic, very few would refuse to grant that some animals have, at the least, a capacity for experiencing, i.e. are sentient, and have an interest in the form their experience takes. To act on the basis of a recognition of another's interest is not necessarily to imagine being the other individual.
It is sometimes thought, by H. L. A. Hart and others, that if it makes sense to speak of natural rights, then human beings, being rational, are the only creatures with natural rights, and that the most natural natural right is freedom from restraint. More precisely, Hart states that:
. . . any adult human being capable of choice (1) has the right to forbearance on the part of all others from the use of coercion or restraint against him save to hinder coercion or restraint and (2) is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons. [A natural right is one which] men have . . . qua men and not only if they . . . stand in some special relation to each other. [And] (2) This right is not created or conferred by men's voluntary action . . . l Now I am no clearer on the meaning of 'natural right' than anyone, but I would have thought that if freedom from restraint is a natural right, then it is the right of any individual capable of suffering from restraint. Perhaps a rational being can be restrained in more ways than a being not so endowed-for example, he can be denied freedom of speech-but why say that only rational beings can be restrained? There seem to be two reasons for Hart's thinking that only rational agents can have these rights, (i) Since children, idiots, and the insane are not capable, for various reasons, of an autonomous existence, we must be permitted to restrain them for reasons other than those given in (1) above. But in any case, animals are perfectly adapted for autonomous existence, (ii) Hart has equated 'liberty to do' with 'no obligation to abstain from'. That someone is not under an obligation to do P might imply that he can be under an obligation to do other things and this applies only to adult humans since only they can be moral agents. It is not necessary to argue that an individual other than an adult human can be a moral agent, for it doesn't strictly follow from 'A has no obligation to do P' that A must be capable of having other obligations. If we want to say (with Hart) that children have no obligations, why can't we still say that they are at liberty to do anything that they are not reasonably forbidden to do, and that they have a right to that liberty? But perhaps we can be clearer by not imposing upon ourselves all the vaguenesses and difficulties built into a concept like 'natural rights'. We may grant, for the purposes of this paper, that X has a right (call it a moral right) on the grounds that, when believing we have an obligation to X, we give as our reason for the obligation something internal, or referring back, to X.
2 With this definition, we are able to carry Hart's distinction between general or natural rights and special rights. In instances of the latter, even though we might give as a reason for an obligation something that seemingly refers back to the subject of the right, for example: 'He has a right to our allegiance because he is king', on examination, it becomes apparent that we are appealing to a social practice that we think is justified. (Note the implications of 'There ought to be a king to whom we owe our allegiance because it is a good social practice to have a monarchy' and 'There ought to be sentient creatures whose sentience we respect because it is a good social practice to have them'.) Also, we should be able to adduce a real connection between what refers to X (our reason) and what we consider as our obligation. So that while it may be true that F is a Frenchman it is not obvious that this is a suitable reason for my having a moral obligation to send food to F. It can be made obvious with a special background-say, France suffered some nation-wide disaster and its people were starving-but then 'F is a Frenchman' is an elliptical way of saying 'F is starving'. This argument is used by Hare in another context. To say that J is Jewish is not itself to give a reason for persecuting him. To accept the implications of such an arbitrary assignment of values is, following Hare, to be a fanatic. Now t there is no difference in form between fanatical ideals that work in favour ; of a certain class of people and those that more explicitly work to the , detriment of a class of people. So, to say, for example, that X has a right i not to be restrained because X is a human being is fanatical unless what we intend is an elliptical statement to the effect that human beings do i suffer from restraint. But then we must be willing to admit that just as .
not only Frenchmen can starve, so also not only human beings can suffer i from restraint.
»
An objection that has been put forth is that it is not the concept of (e.g.) \ 'restraint' but the concept of 'a right' that prevents us from making a t judgment such as '(Certain) animals have the right not to be restrained'. I Hart, for example, says that we fall into the mistake of thinking that animals have rights because we have duties, the performance of which benefits t. animals. The distinction between obligations to and obligations about is • made by the following example: X promises Y that he will look after Y's I aged mother while he is away. Y, then, and not Y's mother, possesses ; certain rights, although it is the mother who stands to benefit by X's | performance. So with babies and animals, 'the moral situation can ; simply and adequately be described . . . by saying that it is wrong or that j we ought not to ill-treat them, or, in the philosopher's generalised sense of I 'duty', that we have a duty not to ill-treat them.' (p. 58)
!
The paradigm case of promising makes it clear that one can't argue ! from P's benefiting from the performance of a duty to P's having certain rights. It would also appear that animals and children cannot have j special rights arising out of a transaction such as a contract, i.e. a transaction which they are not capable of making. But to conclude that \ therefore animals and children cannot have natural rights is to beg the ! question. The function of the practice of promising is to incur 'special' ' -obligations and Hart is assuming (reasonably) that one would not underr take a special obligation about P when one already has an obligation to P, • the contents of both being identical. Surely, though, Hart cannot i establish that we do not have obligations to animals by simply asserting '• that we have obligations about them. And, if we acknowledge that the \ reason we have a duty not to ill-treat them is because they are capable of j suffering, it becomes almost impossible to imagine the grounds for his f assertion.
One discovers Hart's confusion here when one considers what he wishes his example to illustrate: 'It is important for the whole logic of rights that, while the person who stands to benefit by the performance of a duty is discovered by considering what will happen if the duty is not performed, the person who has a right (to whom the performance is owed or due) is discovered by examining the transaction or antecedent situation or relations of the parties out of which the 'duty' arises. These considerations should incline us not to extend to animals and babies whom it is wrong to ill-treat the notion of a right to proper treatment . . . ' (p. 58) As his point depends on looking back to a transaction it is apparent that his argument can only apply to what he calls 'special' rights in which there is an element of duties arising through transactions. Hart's very own definition of a natural right denies the possibility of a transaction or conferring element in the natural right. Hence the ability to enter into a transaction is a necessary condition only for having the sort of special right indicated (i.e. a right that arises out of a transaction or the like). Surely the right not to be ill-treated would be a particular exemplification of the right to be free from restraint and so would needs be considered a natural right.
Even if we have built a 'humans only' connotation into our concept of moral rights, it still doesn't prove that an animal can't have the very thing that we mean by a moral right. Let me illustrate: If someone, S, were to deny that only divorcees receive alimony, we would explain to him that what is meant by 'alimony' in the English language is the maintenance of a divorced wife from the husband's estate. Now he could have thought .
that 'alimony' referred to the maintenance of any person A who lives away from another person B where A is separated because of B's maltreatment of him, or for some similar reason, and where B was and still is responsible (legally) for maintaining A. So S would say, if we concede that the reasons behind a so-separated son's being supported are identical with the reasons for a separated wife's being supported, that we may choose to call the allowances paid in each case by different names, but if we didn't have separate names for them, we should be hard put to explain why the two cases are different. If, indeed, in a certain society only separated wives were paid a stipend, and if the word for this stipend, 'alimony', meant 'paid to separated wives', it would be reasonable for someone to ask whether separated sons in similar conditions ought to receive 'alimony'. Similarly, we may feel that only 'rational agents' have moral rights, but when in a certain case, a right is recognised on the basis of (e.g.) sentience and not rationality, we would be clinging to a concept by fiat in denying the right to sentient beings. In the following analysis of our principles about animals, I wish this distinction to be kept in mind: We will not be talking about principles that contingently relate to animals insofar as the reasons behind the principles do not concern the animals, or insofar as there are no reasons behind the principles. The implications of these sorts of principles would be quite of a different nature from the implications I will be drawing. Consider the following variation of Hart's example: A promises B that he will look after B's pet Greylag, G, while B is on holiday. Now A happens to be very fond of eating goose, but because of his obligation to B, believes that it would be wrong to eat G. Obviously, A's eating another Greylag brings up no problems about his consistency.
One can think of many such examples of principles that contingently relate to animals. For instance, one could believe that it is wrong to kill animals because to do so would have adverse psychological effects, e.g. that it would promote a tendency to violence among men. Philosophers who would deny that animals can be spoken of as having rights are forced to offer these sorts of explanations. II I want to consider the consequences of holding or denying different combinations of the following as prima facie moral principles:
PI. Human life is more valuable than animal life. P2. When there are no overriding considerations it is wrong to kill animals. P3. We have a duty to prevent (or not to cause) animal suffering. PI-I don't intend to go into an analysis of the rationale of such a principle, but wish to consider merely whether it is compatible with moral principles limiting conduct with regard to non-humans, such as a principle recognising an animal's right to freedom from restraint. Animal A's having the right (to be free from restraint) entails that any human H infringing upon A's right must offer moral justification for doing so. For example, he can say that A's action infringes on a certain right he has. Then H can always justify taking A's life when either H or A must die by appealing to the above principle. In cases where two humans are involved the decision wouldn't necessarily be this clear, although there are instances in which it is. When a ship is sinking, the lives of women and children take precedence over the lives of men. To say that H's life is more valuable in certain circumstances or even in all circumstances than A's is not then to say that A's life is valueless.
But are we also committed to sacrificing A's life to improve the quality of H's life, or sacrificing A's with the possible hope of saving H's life? In other words, from the belief that human life is more valuable than animal life, do we mean it to follow that we have a right to kill animals in order to, say, use their eyes to give sight to blind human beings? And if we do mean this to follow, is there any limit as to what can qualify as being an improvement in the quality of human life? Let us, for the sake of argument, take the position that we do mean these sorts of things to follow 3 but that there is a restriction as to what sorts of reasons must be offered in order to take an animal's life.
The reason offered is itself a moral principle subject to the conditions that all moral principles are subject to, viz. universalisability and prescriptivity. For aside from principles regarded as supererogatory, practical considerations, e.g. considerations of convenience, do not give weight to moral decisions. If I believe that stealing books is wrong except when the book in question is one I want very much and is expensive (or except when the bookseller is a bourgeois capitalist), then either I am abandoning a moral principle altogether or I am prepared to commit myself to some ; moral principle about breaking rules that one otherwise adheres to in order to obtain desirable and expensive books or objects (or in order to :
protest against the evils of capitalism). The difference between such a : commitment and stealing when one is overcome by a desire though one believes one ought not to is this: In the former case I do not believe that my act of stealing that particular book is wrong and in the latter case I do.
., P2-When there are no overriding considerations it is wrong to kill animals, or at any rate, some kinds of animals. The reason for the stipulation 'some kinds of animals' is that when 1 considering why it is wrong, we may find that the wrong-making aspect or property does not apply to some members of the animal kingdom. But borderline or difficult cases shouldn't obscure the issue.
A principle like 'Respect the lives of animals you like' cannot qualify as a principle about animals in the sense discussed above. For one thing, the class of animals F likes may be different from the class of animals G likes. So that if F satisfies our stipulation by giving as his reason for / respecting the animals he likes something that is internal to those animals, he is committed to believing that G ought to respect the same animals. He would be involving himself with possible contradictions by then asserting that G ought to respect all and only the animals that he (G) likes. Of course, this principle can be intelligible if given a background that refers not to the animal's moral rights, but instead, as in a previous example, to the advantage (psychological) afforded to the admirer. An adherent to PI and P2 can always justify killing an animal when an appeal to PI is appropriate. But there is one almost universal practice ", that can't readily be subsumed under P1, and yet which must be included as an overriding consideration to P2 if both the practice and the belief in P2 are to co-exist. I am referring to the practice of killing animals for food. The difficulty in subsuming killing for food under PI is of course particular to a society such as ours in which there is choice of adequate foods. (More specifically, the difficulty is particular to individuals who have the choice.) Two strategies are open to us in trying to overcome this difficulty.
(i) P2'-To P2 can be added 'except when they are being killed for food', (ii) P2"-Killing because of a taste for meat can be incorporated into some more general policy statement. P2'-This reformulation of P2 compares neatly with Hare's trumpeter example and is subject to the same criticism that Hare offers.
Suppose that B says 'I am not indeed prepared to prescribe universally that people's likes and dislikes should be disregarded by other people; but I am prepared to prescribe universally that they should be disregarded under a certain specified condition, viz. when they interfere with the playing of the trumpet-that noble instrument. ' (FR: p. 114) So also Suppose that B says 'I am not indeed prepared to prescribe universally that animals' lives should be disregarded by people; but I am prepared to prescribe universally that they should be disregarded under a certain specified condition, viz. when they interfere with the practice of eating meat-that noble pleasure.' The fanaticism in this instance lies even more strongly not in any unfairness to animals but in the legislation of a certain ideal. The ideal works to the disadvantage of other people who might prefer different pleasures that involve killing an animal. P2"-It can be held that where any (human) enjoyment is derived from the result of an animal being killed, the killing is justifiable. Again it would be possible either to legislate as to what shall qualify as an enjoyment or to leave it to the individual to find his pleasure where he may. The former succumbs to the criticism of P2' and the latter involves two further difficulties.
1. Since 'that it gives pleasure' is held to be an overriding condition to P2, we are involving ourselves in a system of values in which the pleasure an action (or consequences) affords one is morally significant. At the one extreme it may be that one's own pleasure is the only consideration in deciding the Tightness or wrongness of an action. (Egoistic hedonism) In such a system, 'Except when we enjoy it or its consequences we ought not to kill animals' is not a moral principle about animals since it follows trivially from 'We ought to do only those things we enjoy'. It may be, though, that one's enjoyment of an act is one consideration among many, so that the fact that it is pleasurable may not weigh enough when considering e.g. taking a human's life. To judge the importance of P2 in this system, we need only ask what other principles can be overridden by the pleasure principle. Intuitively, I would say that in the moral system roughly shared in our society there is no other principle that can be so overridden. It would seem, then, that if one were to include P2 in a hierarchy of the values of this system, it would be the least important, the second least important being 'One ought (morally) to do what gives one pleasure'. It also follows that any other value that cannot be overridden by the pleasure principle can override P2. If someone does not consider himself morally justified in lying in instances in which it gives him pleasure to lie, then if he were asked to kill an innocent dog and report back when this is done, to be consistent he would either kill the dog or report that he hadn't rather than report that he had killed the dog in order to save the dog's life; in other words, lie in order to save the dog's life.
2. In fact, all reasons for killing animals are not considered by many to be equally valid, even if all the killings have equally pleasurable consequences. There are at least two possible reasons why this might be so. (a) Certain killing might be opposed because it is useless. By useless, one can't mean unnecessary, since eating meat is unnecessary. Perhaps it is wasteful. (Some might feel that skinning a seal and leaving the carcass to rot or killing a fox is wasteful.) Although it is not quite contradictory, it does seem odd that one person should hold both that it is immoral to be wasteful and that one has a moral right, in a sense stronger than a liberty, to pleasurable activities, (b) It might be held that in certain instances killing an animal is wrong because it involves cruelty to the animal, or perhaps to its young. I hope it will become evident in the course of this paper why such a position is untenable.
P3-We have a duty to prevent (or not to cause) animal suffering.* If we take P3 in such a way that it cannot be overridden by the pleasure principle discussed above, it is of little consequence whether we consider the ad hoc formulation of a moral system including P2 (P2") or deny P2 altogether in showing that absurdities follow from holding P3 and rejecting full inclusion of P2. My argument will be based on the combination of not-P2 and P3 because it is less cumbersome. A brief analogy might indicate why my arguments pertain also to the inclusion of P2". Say we believe that it is wrong to lie and also in a particular circumstance have a duty to protect someone's life. The example that comes to mind is that of the French peasant hiding an allied soldier in his attic. When the Nazis come around, it will obviously not be wrong for him to lie in order to protect the soldier. So, although it is prima facie wrong, it is not wrong in these circumstances. The duty to the soldier overrides the duty about lying. A 'catholic' theory of ethics might hold that all our duties are absolute, so that even in these circumstances it is wrong. But we could not have formulated our weak P2 on such a non-hierarchical theory, so its consideration is irrelevant here.
If a man were to consider it his duty to prevent all animal suffering, then it would follow that he ought to exterminate all animal life. We are, after all, merely talking about preventing suffering and have made no mention of maximising pleasure. For to talk of maximising pleasure would be to recall P2. The reason for this absurd consequence is that we have refused to grant that an animal's life has value capable of overriding some actions that could be taken to prevent suffering. 5 And it is for this reason that philosophers cannot draw analogies they may wish to draw, namely, between our reactions to instances of animal suffering and our reactions to human problems such as euthanasia. It is not support for mercy-killing that follows from our 'moral' attitudes toward animals, but something more like this: Say your doctor holds that P3 (for humans) and not-P2 (for humans) and you complain to him of a stomach ache. Say, also, that he cannot diagnose or cure your stomach ache. The rational alternative open to him would be to (painlessly) kill you. Of course you might argue that the suspicion that he might kill you would cause you even greater suffering, so that this would be a very unwieldy combination of principles to hold for human beings, but this would be to assume that one cannot hold one's own life to be valueless, and this is not obviously true.
A different, yet also sublimely simple, consequence follows if we hold that we have a duty not to cause animal suffering. The hunter's justification for culling deer is that nature offers them a crueller death; in other words, he is preventing suffering by causing a smaller suffering. If he sees it as his obligation simply not to cause suffering, then he ought not to shoot deer at all, for by leaving deer alone he can ensure that he doesn't cause them suffering whereas by killing them, he can only try not to cause suffering, or cause as little suffering as possible. As to the hunter's claim that he wishes to prevent suffering, I have already shown that the methods he is using are inadequate.' A similar argument holds for anyone slaughtering domestic livestock.
P3'-It is wrong to cause an animal to suffer except when it is to be killed and then we have a duty to see that it suffers as little as possible. Here we get around the difficulty of its being more certain that we don't cause suffering if we refrain from killing the animal, but P3' falls to the same criticism that P2 fell to; namely, we are saying that it is wrong to cause an animal to suffer except in a certain overriding circumstance. But either (i) our right to kill animals is stronger than our duty to abstain from causing suffering, and so the pleasure principle (above) also overrides P3; (Then if we derive any enjoyment from it we have a right to cause animals to suffer.) or (ii) This circumstance is not one which is forced upon us by other moral considerations, but one which we deliberately choose. We arrive at 'It is wrong to cause an animal to suffer except when we choose to kill it in which case it is possible that we will have caused it to suffer'. (When you add 'kill economically and so that it is fit for human consumption' it becomes even more probable that the animal will suffer.) And we can argue, as before, that it isn't adequate to make 'choosing to kill for food' an exception to our first clause, but rather 'choosing to kill for any purpose that we choose'. So that we must say: We have a duty to see that it suffers as little as possible as is compatible with our purpose in killing it.
Then is it not fanatical to claim that it is wrong to cause an animal to suffer except when we choose to kill it ? Why not say, it is wrong except when we choose? Ill In Part I, it was argued that there is no a priori reason to deny that animals can be proper subjects of moral rights. Any ethical system which makes use of such a concept, then, is bound on grounds of consistency to consider what the natural limits of the application of the right would be. Hart, indeed, makes this not merely a point of consistency, but true by the very nature of his analysis of what a natural right is. For, if we substitute x for 'man' and its synonyms where they appear in his definition that I have quoted in Page I, we see that since natural rights are not created or con* ferred by men's voluntary action, there is no reason to suppose that only men are subjects of natural rights and every reason to suppose that they are not.
It is often believed that man has a natural right to his life, at the least insofar as he interferes with no other man's life. It is also believed that he has a right not to be caused undue suffering, or, stronger yet, that he has a right that others strive to alleviate any suffering he might become inflicted
•'
with. (The dubiousness of the last as a possible natural right need not concern us here.) I have sought to draw out the consequences of according these rights to animals. Part II, then, was devoted to considering the following principles: PI Human life is more valuable than animal life. P2 When there are no overriding considerations it is wrong to kill | animals. P3 We have a duty to prevent (or not to cause) animal suffering.
Philosophers who would not wish to hold that animals can have rights may still believe that P2 and P3 essentially deserve a place in one's moral system. Where their reasons for believing in them has been due to some properties or characteristics of animals, they have de facto, if not dejure, recognised the rights of animals. Where they have given as their reason some duty to other men, or to God, and at the same time subscribe to the idea that men have these natural (or moral) rights, they have been guilty | of a sort of fanaticism.
[ In the main, I considered the difficulty of holding P3 and rejecting P2, j where these entail a de facto recognition of the moral rights of animals. Where one's concern is simply not to cause suffering, one becomes bound to a policy of non-interference that would lead to an abstinence from killing animals even though one does not consider that animals have a : right to their lives. On the other hand, when one claims to wish to pre-; vent suffering, one seems to become intractably, though unintentionally, involved with an extreme form of negative utilitarianism. This suggests : -that a respect for sentience and a respect for the value of a life do not • separate themselves as easily as we might wish. ;
But then it seems as though our behaviour toward animals is not guided by these moral principles at all. In any case, our attitude toward animals is different in kind from our attitude toward humans. Human problems : that seem to be analogous (for example, euthanasia) to the relations we , have with animals are not so, in fact, since they arise out of a conflict between moral values.
